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CHINA AND THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING
TRADE AGREEMENT - ACTA FAITH, OR ACTA
FUTILITY?:

AN EXPOSITION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ENFORCEMENT IN THE AGE OF SHANZHAI (山寨)
Leroy J. Pelicci, Jr. *
This comment presents a snapshot of the current state of intellectual
property (“IP”) enforcement in China in light of a controversial new
treaty designed to address the illicit, yet by all accounts thriving, industry
of trade in pirated and counterfeit goods. Beginning with an overview of
IP-intensive industries, this comment highlights the significance and value
of this unique form of property, both to individuals and to national
economies. This comment then shifts in focus to the areas of commerce
most affected by counterfeiting and piracy, discussing China’s prevalent
role in the epidemic, and its copycat subculture known as “Shanzhai.”
Thereafter, a discussion of IP rights evolution in China is presented,
coupled with a general historical exposition to provide insight into the
ideologies that inform current Chinese attitudes towards IP. With this
cultural analysis as a backdrop, this comment addresses ACTA,
examining its relevance in light of similar treaties that have preceded it,
and the curious absence of China in ACTA’s negotiation and drafting.
In turn, this comment suggests that even if China were to become a
signatory to the treaty, IP theft in China would likely continue as usual
because history suggests that any positive changes in the enforcement of IP
rights in China will come about through internal means, and not through
the imposition of a stringent treaty by China’s more economically
developed neighbors. Finally, this comment discusses one such internal
change, a new Chinese tort law which is expected to have a positive and
far reaching effect on the protection of IP in China.
J.D. candidate 2012, Penn State University Dickinson School of Law, and a former
RCA recording artist. This comment was inspired by the author's personal experiences
working in the entertainment industry for ten years and seeing first-hand the detrimental
effects of intellectual property theft on individuals and businesses alike. The author would like
to thank the following individuals for making this comment possible: Professor Barbara
Brunner, Professor Geoffrey Scott, Harlan Glasser, Matthew Charles, and Benjamin
Hackman.
*
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I. CLIFF’S NOTES1
The year 2006 may have marked the beginning of a more aggressive
trend in the protection of intellectual property ("IP"); then again, it very well
may not have. That year, the United States got together with Europe, Japan,
and Switzerland to sketch out a new international trade agreement, called the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement ("ACTA"). The declared purpose of
this "state-of-the-art" 2 agreement is to "combat counterfeiting and piracy." 3
Numerous international agreements on IP protection already exist; so why
does the world need another one? Apparently because there is a need for
"new, detailed rules on enforcement measures"4 and a "new architecture for
international cooperation."5
Several skeptical commentators have noted that without the
cooperation of China, which is not yet a party to the negotiations but
accounts for approximately 80% of IP-infringing goods seized at U.S. borders,
ACTA will have at most a limited effect on global piracy and counterfeiting.6
While that observation is poignant indeed, the purpose of this comment is to
take it a step further. Accordingly, the comment will suggest that even if
China were to sign ACTA, Chinese IP theft would continue as usual. It will
also suggest that if a change in lax Chinese IP rights protection methods is to
come about at all, it will come from within China, and not from a treaty
imposed on it by its economically powerful neighbors.
On that account, Section II will examine the importance of IP in
driving economic growth, supporting jobs, and protecting consumers. The
section will also highlight existing international agreements that have been
designed to protect IP. Section III will briefly describe ACTA's history and
purpose, and will introduce a major deficiency in the treaty’s negotiations that
is highly likely to thwart the realization of its goals. Section IV will provide a
glimpse into the wild world of Chinese IP infringers, focusing on selected
areas of knock-off specialty, and will explore the phenomenon of Shanzhai.7
Section V will present an overview of some key historic milestones in the
* J.D. candidate 2012, The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law.
1 "Cliff's Notes" is a registered trademark of John Wiley & Sons, Inc., has no
affiliation with this comment, and is being used without permission.
2 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (2010), http://www.ustr.gov/acta.
3 Id.
4 Aaron X. Fellmeth, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement in the Public Eye, ASIL
INSIGHTS (June 24, 2010), http://www.asil.org/insights100624.cfm.
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., id.; see also China and ACTA: Why Is The Problem Not Made Part Of The
Solution?,
IP
DRAGON
(Apr.
9,
2009)
[hereinafter
IP
DRAGON],
http://ipdragon.blogspot.com/2009/04/china-and-acta-why-is-problem-not.html.
7 See generally Philipp Boeing, Shanzhai – Dimensions of a Chinese Phenomenon
(2009), http://
www.frankfurtschool.de/content/en/ecbc/ecbc_portal/content_files/file33/CBR2009_001_
Boeing_shanzhai.pdf.
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development of Chinese IP law, which in turn will provide some insight into
the ideologies that inform modern Chinese IP enforcement. Section VI will
afford an overview of current modes of recourse, both judicial and
administrative, for injured IP rights holders (hereinafter "IPR holders") in
China and the mechanisms in place that are supposed to enforce judgments.
Section VII will highlight the inadequacies in these modes of recourse in light
of the latest challenges facing IPR enforcement in China, and Section VIII
will explore IP in China as it relates to its economic development. This
section will include a glimpse of the shoddy enforcement practices that have
developed as a result of China's narrow-minded view of the role of IP.
Section IX will illustrate why ACTA is likely to have little or no effect on the
problem of IP theft in China, whether or not China becomes a party, and will
present trends in Chinese IP firms suggesting that if changes in shoddy IP
enforcement practices are to come about at all, they are most likely to come
from within China itself. This section will also include a discussion of one
such change: the new Tort Law of the People's Republic of China, which is
expected to have a far-reaching effect on the protection of IP in China.
Finally, Section X will sum up the foregoing and leave you with the author’s
personal reflections.
II. WHY SHOULD I CARE?
IP is wrapped up in everything. It can refer to anything from an
inventor's life-saving creation8 to an unflattering fleece toga, like The Snuggie.9
A composer's revolutionary masterpiece is IP. A Justin Bieber song is IP. 10
Consider for a moment that creations protected by patents, trademarks,
copyrights and trade secrets affect nearly every industry, including auto,
medical, energy, entertainment, fashion, and electronics. 11 A couple of IP
factoids may help illuminate the oft overlooked reach of this ideas-based
ecosystem.
A. For What It's Worth
As mentioned above, IP fuels economies, and as luck would have it,
America is a net exporter of IP. 12 Of the twenty-seven U.S. tradable
industries,13 those relying heavily on innovation and creativity, that is, the IPGlobal Intellectual Property Center, Frequently Asked Questions (2010)
[hereinafter GIPC FAQ], http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/faq.
9 Allen Salkin, Snuggie on the Street: Watch Your Back, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, at
ST1.
10
JUSTIN BIEBER, EENIE MEENIE (Island Records, 2010), available at
http://www.mtv.com/videos/justin-bieber/
512194/eenie-meenie.jhtml.
11 GIPC FAQ, supra note 8.
12 SHAYERAH ILIAS & IAN F. FERGUSSON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 11 (Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2008).
13 The Impact of Innovation and the Role of Intellectual Property Rights on U.S. Productivity,
Competitiveness, Jobs, Wages and Exports, NDP CONSULTING 6 (Apr. 24, 2010) [hereinafter The
Impact
of
Innovation],
8
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intensive industries,14 account for more than half of all U.S. exports and help
drive forty percent of U.S. economic growth.15 America's IP portfolio, with
an estimated value of over $5 trillion, is worth more than the gross domestic
product ("GDP") of any other country.16 Because IP-intensive industries are
much more likely to rebound from economic downturns than non-IP
industries, 17 IP will likely play a large role in recovering from the current
economic crisis.18
In addition to being a hot commodity, IP creates high-paying jobs. As
of 2008, IP-intensive industries employed 18 million Americans.19 Some of
these industries, such as pharmaceuticals, computers, and electronics, are
slated to expand more over the next decade than the national average. 20
Moreover, IP jobs employ individuals at all educational and skill levels. 21 For
example, between 2000 and 2007, the annual salaries of low-skilled workers in
IP-intensive industries averaged forty percent higher than those in non-IPintensive industries. 22 Finally, the benefits of IP can be seen from a
demographic standpoint; manufacturing workers in IP-intensive states earn
about $7,000 per year more than their counterparts in non-IP-intensive
states.23
Further, IP-intensive industries help keep jobs from disappearing by
reducing the trade 24 deficit. 25 Among the twenty-seven U.S. tradable
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/sites/default/files/reports/documents/NDP_IP_Jobs_S
tudy_Hi_Res.pdf.
14 Id. at 4.
15 Press Release, Bush Administration Officials Update Congress on Intellectual
Property Enforcement Efforts (July 26, 2006) (on file with U.S. Department of Commerce),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2007/07-26-06ip.jsp.
16
ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & KEVIN A. HASSETT, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
3,
15
(2005),
available
at
http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/IntellectualPropertyReport-October2005.pdf.
17 The Impact of Innovation, supra note 13, at 7.
18 World Intellectual Property Indicators, World Intellectual Property Organization 57
(2009), http://
www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/intproperty/941/.
wipo_pub_941.pdf.
19 Press Release, Secretary of Commerce Carlos M. Gutierrez Opinion Editorial
(May 11, 2008) (on file with U.S. Department of Commerce), available at http://20012009.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/PressReleases_FactSheets/PROD01_005990.
20 ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & NAM D. PHAM, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY-INTENSIVE MANUFACTURING IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2007), available at
http://www.sonecon
.com/docs/studies/0807_thevalueofip.pdf.
21 The Impact of Innovation, supra note 13, at 6.
22 Id.
23 Robert J. Shapiro & Nam D. Pham, supra note 20, at 6.
24 A trade balance is the difference between exports, which create domestic jobs,
and imports, which eliminate them. Generally speaking, when a country is importing more
than it is exporting, the result is a trade deficit. When the opposite occurs, a trade surplus
results. IP-intensive industries promote the latter. Robert E. Scott, The U.S. Trade Deficit: Are
We
Trading
Away
Our
Future?
(Mar.
4,
2002),
http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/webfeatures_viewpoints_tradetestimony/;
KEVIN
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industries, only six reported trade surpluses annually between 2000 and 2007,
five of which were IP-intensive industries, generating an average of $14.6
billion in trade surplus each year. 26 As an example, in 2005 the American
motion picture industry alone had a $9.5 billion trade surplus, which
represented twelve percent of the entire private-sector surplus that year.27
While the above data provide insight into IP's economic significance,
the term "intellectual property" has been used somewhat ambiguously up to
this point. This is due in part to the fact that IP, by definition, is a somewhat
ethereal concept, referring to a number of intangible "creations of the mind."28
However, as the discussion now turns to IP-theft, it will become both more
concrete and more exciting because the focus shifts to the physical
embodiment of those creations and the people stealing them - or because
"piracy" makes us think of pirates, and everyone loves pirates.29
B. Multiplicity
IP theft drains economies, costing the U.S. alone billions of dollars
and hundreds of thousands of jobs per year.30 At U.S. ports, IP-infringing
products seized in 2009 had an estimated street value of more than $260
million,31 a conservative figure considering that it is difficult to estimate how
many counterfeit U.S. goods are sold abroad.32 Much easier to estimate is
Americans' obsession with looking good and playing with gadgets. In 2009,
counterfeit footwear was the top commodity seized by Customs and Border
Protection, with a domestic value of $99.78M and accounting for 38% [be
consistent between numerals or text – you do it both ways in the first few
NELSON, EXPORTING AND IMPORTING, REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS (Encyclopedia of
Business,
2nd
ed.
2010),
available
at
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/management/ExGov/Exporting-andImporting.html.
25 The Impact of Innovation, supra note 13, at 6.
26 Id. at 26.
27 Motion Picture Association of America, The Economic Impact of the Motion
Picture & Television Production Industry on the United States 11 (2006), http://
universitytoolkit.org/press_releases/mpa%20us%20economic%20impact%20report_final.pdf
.
28 World Intellectual Property Organization, About Intellectual Property (2010),
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/.
29 Sandy Hemphill, International Talk Like A Pirate Day, BELLAONLINE (Sept. 19,
2010), http://www.bellaonline.com/articles/art68577.asp.
30 Lauren McCurdy, Top 10 Seized Counterfeit Goods, CNBC (July 9, 2009),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/37824359/Top_10_Seized_Counterfeit_Goods?slide=1.
31 Customs and Border Protection, Intellectual Property Rights - Seizure Statistics:
Fiscal Year 2009 2, 7 (2009) [hereinafter Seizure Statistics], available at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/priority_trade/ipr/pubs/seizure/fy09_stats.ctt
/fy09_stats.pdf.
32 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (2010), http://www.ustr.gov/acta; Lauren McCurdy, supra note 30; Laura Zakaras,
Film Piracy and Its Connection to Organized Crime and Terrorism, RAND PROJECT (2009),
http://www.randproject.org/
pubs/research_briefs/RB9417/index1.html.
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pages] of the entire value of infringing goods.33 Consumer electronics came in
at number two, with a value of $31.77M (12% of total seizures), and
Handbags/Wallets/Backpacks went neck and neck with Apparel (value of
$21.46M - 8% of total seizures), taking third place with a value of $21.50M, or
8% of total seizures.34
While "traditional" knock-offs continue to top the charts,35 products
posing serious health risks are by no means wanting. According to the World
Health Organization, up to 10% of medicines worldwide are counterfeit - a
purportedly deadly hazard that experts say costs the pharmaceutical industry
around $46 billion a year.36 One such group of experts, the U.S.-based Center
for Medicine in the Public Interest, predicts that counterfeit drug sales will
reach $75 billion globally in 2010, an increase of more than 90% from 2005.37
Similarly, counterfeiting of food38 and other consumer products is estimated
to cost those industries $10 to $15 billion per year.39 On the transportation
front, the Federal Trade Commission reports that the counterfeiting of vehicle
components is out of control and poses major safety risks, costing the global
auto parts industry $12 billion a year in lost sales. 40 Thus, effective
enforcement of IP transcends mere economic interests; it encompasses the
protection and well-being of society.
C. Agree to Disagree
A little more than a century ago, the United States was a piracy Mecca,
making unauthorized copies of British books to its heart's content. 41
Everyone hated the United States. Things changed, however, not because of
Seizure Statistics, supra note 31.
Id.
35 Id.
36 Balfour, Frederick, Amy Barrett, Diane Brady, Kerry Capell, Paul Magnusson,
Carol Matlack, Dexter Roberts, William C. Symonds, and Johnathan Wheatley, Fakes!,
BUSINESSWEEK,
Feb.
7,
2005,
at
54,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_06/b3919001_mz001.htm.
37 Center for Medicine in the Public Interest, Counterfeit Drugs and China (May 31,
2006), http://www.cmpi.org/in-the-news/testimony/counterfeit-drugs-and-china-new.
38 For example, Pennsylvania's own Heinz Tomato Ketchup (or Catsup depending
on locale) is a favorite among counterfeiting pros. Robert C. Bird, Symposium: Counterfeit Drugs:
A Global Consumer Perspective, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 387, 403-4 (2008) (discussing
brazen pirates in China, counterfeiting not only the Heinz products, but using fake Heinz
delivery trucks and uniforms for distribution).
39 Grocery Manufacturers Association and A.T. Kearney, Consumer Product Fraud:
Deterrence
and
Detection
3
(2010),
http://www.atkearney.com/images/global/pdf/Consumer_Product_Fraud.pdf.
40
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROTECTING VALUABLE ASSETS IN A GLOBAL
MARKET
2-4
(MEMA
Brand
Protection
Council,
3rd
ed.
2009),
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/BASCAP/Pages/IntellectualPropertyVers3.pdf.
41 See ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM
GUTENBERG TO GATES 159 (University of Chicago Press, 2009); see also Battle of Ideas,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 2009, at 68 (noting that America was the great copyright and patent
infringer when it was a developing country in the 18th century).
33
34
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morals, but because of economics. 42 Once America embraced its own
innovations, it wanted some protection overseas and was willing to protect
foreign IP domestically in exchange. 43 To this end, bilateral agreements
usually did the trick. 44 Nowadays, however, the demands of multinational
trade and economics require major creativity and cooperation among multiple
nations with all kinds of special needs. Accordingly, there have been
numerous international agreements that attempt to achieve a "transnational
harmonization" of IP law.45
Two of the first were the Paris Convention, signed in 1883,46 followed
by the Berne Convention three years later.47 The mandates of the agreements
were pretty unobtrusive, and states had lots of flexibility to achieve the
substantive balance they wanted in their own domestic laws.48 There were no
real enforcement mechanisms though, rather a consolidation of norms on
which the world already agreed.49
Yet these treaties laid the foundation for the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO"), a multilateral organization established in
1967 as a specialized agency of the United Nations. 50 With a mission to
"promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world
through cooperation among States," 51 WIPO was a good forum for treaty
negotiations and soft law; yet, like Berne, WIPO produced no uniform
standards or enforcement measures.52
The next promising venue for enforcement of IPR didn't hit the scene
until 1994; this was the World Trade Organization (WTO). 53 This
42 CRAIG JOYCE, MARSHALL LEAFFER, PETER JASZI, & TYLER OCHOA, COPYRIGHT
LAW 30 (LexisNexis, 8th ed. 2010).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See generally Kim Nayyer, Globalization of Information: Intellectual Property Law
Implications (Dec. 27, 2001), http://131.193.153.231/www/issues/issue7_1/
nayyer/index.html.
46
THE PARIS CONVENTION LAWS (2010), http://patent.laws.com/the-parisconvention; WIPO Database of Intellectual Property: Legislative Texts, Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) [hereinafter Paris Convention],
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.pdf.
47 See id.
48 Graeme Dinwoodie, The WIPO Copyright Treaty: A Transition to the Future of
International Copyright Lawmaking?, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 751, 756 (2007).
49 Id.
50 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO TREATIES - GENERAL
INFORMATION (2010), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general/.
51 UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION,
GUIDE TO ARCHIVES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: WIPO (2010),
http://www.unesco.org/archives/sio/Eng/
presentation_print.php?idOrg=1038.
52 Margot Kaminski, Recent Development: The Origins and Potential Impact of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 247, 248 (2009).
53 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].
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intergovernmental forum was created to deal with the "regulation of trade
between participating countries, provide a framework for negotiating and
formalizing trade agreements, and offer a dispute resolution process aimed at
enforcing the participants' adherence to WTO agreements."54 The part of the
WTO that deals with IP is another agreement called the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 55 Admittedly, this
can get confusing. The WTO didn't replace WIPO. 56 WIPO still exists,
providing various important resources to the IP community. 57 Similarly,
TRIPS didn't replace the WTO, but, rather, it is an agreement within an
agreement.58 Important to note, however, is that TRIPS essentially removed
IP enforcement from the WIPO's “to do” list, and put it on the WTO's.59
The significance of this will become clearer during the discussion of "forum
shifting" below.
Nonetheless, TRIPS was revolutionary in that it set the first minimum
international standards for IP law and created obligations that could actually
be enforced through trade sanctions.60 Because of TRIPS, the WTO was a
favorite of both the U.S. and the European Community. As one scholar
noted:
The U.S. and the European Community benefited
from a shift to the WTO for three reasons: they had more
negotiating power in the WTO than in WIPO; they could link
IP to numerous other trade concerns; and the WTO dispute
settlement system was seen as extremely effective. In other
words, the WTO had teeth, and WIPO did not.61
However, once folks start suggesting "more negotiating power" as a
motivator, things start to smell fishy and claims of "forum shifting" inevitably
follow.62 In the IPR context, forum shifting refers to the practice by countries
seeking to "ration" IP ("IP protectionists"), of switching to a more hospitable
venue when the current venue becomes less responsive to a "high
protectionist agenda,"63 - like when cool kids take their ball to play somewhere
else, and anyone who wants to play has to follow. Remembering, however,
54 World Trade Organization, What Is the World Trade Organization? (2010),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm.
55 TRIPS, supra note 53.
56 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 25 (2004).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 2.
59 Kaminski, supra note 52, at 247.
60
U.S. Dep't of State, Focus on Intellectual Property Rights 16 (2006),
http://www.america.gov/media/pdf/books/iprbook.pdf#popup.
61 Helfer, supra note 56, at 21-2.
62 Id.
63 SUSAN K. SELL, THE GLOBAL IP UPWARD RATCHET, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING
AND PIRACY ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 5 (June 9, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.ip-watch.org/files/SusanSellfinalversion.pdf.
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that the U.S. went through an infringement phase in its adolescence, it is
understandable that developing countries are not thrilled about agreeing to
heightened levels of enforcement that might be against their immediate
interests. Accordingly, there have been numerous TRIPS-related backlashes
from developing countries64 and non-governmental organizations.65
Nonetheless, the IP protectionists have forged ahead, pushing for a
"TRIPS-plus" regime by adding new requirements through bilateral trade
agreements. 66 One commentator suggests the trend in IP protectionism is
getting so crazy that it is headed towards a "TRIPS-Plus-Plus regime."67 The
theory is that through copious references to consumer "safety" and "security,"
IP protectionists will continue to get law enforcement agencies involved in the
IP maximalist cause,68 resulting in a "fear-mongering"69 agenda that at present
already includes initiatives such as Interpol’s SECURE; the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce’s “Coalition against Counterfeiting and Piracy Intellectual Property
Enforcement Initiative: Campaign to Protect America”; and the Security and
Prosperity Partnership of North America.70
III. ACTA FAITH
In 2006, the U.S. and several key trading partners (Europe, Japan &
Switzerland) launched negotiations for what some believe to be the ultimate
act of forum shifting:71 ACTA,72 a new plurilateral73 treaty with the declared
Id.; PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO
OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 135 (2002); U.N. World Intellectual Prop. Org.
[WIPO] Gen. Assembly, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a
Development Agenda for WIPO, P II, WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004).
65 Helfer, supra note 56, at 4-6.
66 See Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 791, 792-807 (2001) (describing the bilateral agreements negotiated by the
European Community and the United States with developing country governments as
"TRIPS-plus").
67 Sell, supra note 63, at 4.
68
Jay Fraser, Counterfeiting - A Matter of National Security (May 12, 2008),
http://threatswatch.org/rapidrecon/2008/05/counterfeiting-a-matter-of-nat/.
69 Sell, supra note 63, at 4.
70 Id.
71 See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 52, at 247 (proposing that "ACTA reflects a form of
international bullying, whereby economically powerful countries, frustrated by the blockades
erected in international fora they once supported, have stepped outside those fora to create
new standards"); Margot Kaminski, Treaty Targets Internet, Not Purses, HUFFINGTON POST
(2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/margot-kaminski/the-anti-counterfeitingt_b_554480.html (calling ACTA a departure from existing international law and noting that it
is more than likely that developing countries will end up joining ACTA's terms without
having helped to negotiate them); GENNADY STOLYAROV II, ACTA: THE WAR ON
PROGRESS, FREEDOM, AND HUMAN CIVILIZATION (2010), http://mises.org/daily/4593
(stating that ACTA contravenes every principle of civilized society, both in its content and in
the nature of the proceedings leading to its creation).
72 Global Intellectual Property Center, Conclude Ambitious and Comprehensive
ACTA (2010) [hereinafter GIPC A&C], http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/pages/acta-0; see
also Aaron X. Fellmeth, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement in the Public Eye, ASIL INSIGHTS
(June 24, 2010), http://www.asil.org/insights100624.cfm.
64
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purpose "to establish international standards for enforcing IP rights in order
to fight more efficiently the growing problem of [trademark] counterfeiting
and [copyright] piracy."74 Since 2006, countries that have accepted invitations
to join the festivities include Australia, Canada, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco,
New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. 75
Curiously, not invited to the party was the People's Republic of China76 [enter
sad trombone sound effect77 HERE].
According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ACTA will:
build upon existing international rules . . . to help ensure
that 'like minded' trading partners address counterfeiting and
piracy and its damaging effects by raising the bar on
enforcement, improving cooperation among partners,
harmonizing how countries confront IP theft, and 'setting a
positive example' for nations that aspire to have strong IP
enforcement regimes.78
Drafts of ACTA79 were formally made public on April 21, 2010,80 and several
provisions would require participants to adopt laws replicating U.S. copyright

73 A plurilateral treaty is a special type of multilateral treaty between a limited
number of states with a particular interest in the subject of the treaty. The primary difference
between a plurilateral treaty and other multilateral treaties is the limited availability in the
former of reservations [unilateral statements, however phrased or named, made by a
sovereign state when signing, ratification accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty whereby
it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their
application to that state]. Due to the limited nature of a plurilateral treaty, the full
cooperation of the parties to the treaty is required in order for the object of the treaty to be
met. As a result, reservations to plurilateral treaties are not allowed without the consent of all
other parties to the treaty. ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 67, 71
(Cambridge
Univ.
Press
2005),
available
at
http://www.ebookbyte.com/admin/upload/Law/Handbook%20of%20International%20La
w%20%28www.eBookByte.com%29.pdf.
74 Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., ACTA - Summary of Key Elements Under
Discussion
(2009),
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/factsheets/2009/november/acta-summary-key-elements-under-discussion. The original ACTA
drafts dealt with patent infringement only peripherally, in a few scattered sections. See generally
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, [Public Predecisional/Deliberative Draft] §§ 1, 4, Apr.
20,
2010,
at
7,
18
[hereinafter
ACTA
APRIL
2010
DRAFT],
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1883. The most current draft has eliminated any
provisions regarding patents. See generally Office of the U. S. Trade Rep., ACTA [Public
Predecisional/Deliberative Draft], Oct. 2, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA OCTOBER 2010 DRAFT],
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2338.
75 Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)
(2010), http://www.ustr.gov/acta.
76 Kaminski, supra note 52 at 250; IP DRAGON, supra note 5.
77
For a good "sad trombone" sound effect, see SADTROMBONE.COM,
http://www.sadtrombone.com/.
78 GIPC A&C, supra note 72 (emphasis added).
79 See generally ACTA APRIL 2010 DRAFT, supra note 74.
80 GIPC A&C, supra note 72.
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and trademark law (America! F**k Yeah! 81 ), including procedures and
remedies that are unfamiliar to many countries (for example, cease-and-desist
orders, punitive or statutory civil damages for IP infringement, and
injunctions to prevent infringing goods from being exported).82 Nonetheless,
according to a press release by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR), "participants have affirmed their commitment to continue their work
with the aim of concluding ACTA."83 Naturally, one might wonder why an
initiative that is so heavy on enforcement has excluded from the negotiating
process developing countries84 that are most often identified as infringement
culprits and would probably be affected the most by ACTA's provisions. 85
Some say that this is not an oversight, but, rather, a strategic maneuver
intended to single out bad eggs like China and pressure them into
compliance. 86 Unsurprisingly, current ACTA negotiators deny such claims,
although unconvincingly.87

This is a reference to a song played throughout various parts of the 2004 action
comedy film, Team America: World Police.
The
chorus
proclaims:"America!
F**k
yeah!
Comin'
again
to
save
the
mother
f**kin'
day
yeah!
America! F**k yeah!
Freedom is the only way yeah!"
TEAM AMERICA: WORLD POLICE, AMERICA, F**K YEAH (Atlantic Records 2004). As its title
suggests, the film plays off of domestic and international political criticisms that the U.S.
frequently and unilaterally attempts to "police the world" through its interventionism. ACTA
is a prime example of just such unilateral policing.
82 See ACTA OCTOBER 2010 DRAFT, supra note 75 at 9; see also Fellmeth, supra note
72 (discussing key provisions of the April 2010 draft).
83 Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., The Office of the U.S. Trade Rep
Releases Statement of ACTA Negotiating Partners on Recent ACTA Negotiations (Apr. 16,
2010),
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/april/office-ustrade-representative-releases-statement-ac.
84 Nations excluded from negotiations include the "BRICs" (that is, Brazil, Russia,
India, and China), as well as Argentina, Chile, Egypt, South Africa, and Indonesia. Michael
Geist, The ACTA Threat to the Future of WIPO (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2009/
04/14/the-acta-threat-to-the-future-of-wipo/.
85 IP DRAGON, supra note 5; Geist, supra note 84.
86 Even though developing countries are not party to the ACTA negotiations, it is
likely that accession to, and implementation of, ACTA by developing countries will be a
condition imposed in future free trade agreements. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,
Electronic Frontier Foundation (2010), http://www.eff.org/issues/acta; see also Geist, supra
note 84; and Kaminski, supra note 52, at 250.
87 For example, in a recent ACTA fact sheet, the European Trade Commission
(ETC) maintained that "the ultimate objective is that large emerging economies, where IP
rights enforcement could be improved, such as China . . . will sign up to the global pact.
ACTA is not intended to isolate these countries or point the finger at their enforcement
efforts." However, only a few paragraphs later, the fact sheet reminds the reader that "the
EU is consistently pushing countries like China to enforce anti-counterfeiting legislation and
to make the legal penalties for IP theft more effective [and that] the EU is . . . continuing to
work with countries like China . . . to stop widespread and systematic piracy of . . . intellectual
assets." European Trade Commission, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) Fact
Sheet
(Jan.
5,
2009),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/january/tradoc_142039.pdf. If China were
81
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It is reasonable to conclude there is some merit to the intentional
exclusion theory. The following section paints a rather vivid picture of how
China is flouting the international community's IP-enforcement conventions.
IV. BIG TROUBLE IN LITTLE CHINA88
The knock-off industry in China can be summed up by a well-known
Shanghai saying, "we can copy everything except your mother." 89 Perhaps
with advances in human genetic cloning technology underway in China,90 the
"mother exception" will be dropped. For the time being, the saying as it reads
is by all accounts an accurate one. In an article appropriately entitled, China
Officially Almost Out of Things to Counterfeit, one commentator noted that "while
it's not news to anyone that China has a minor counterfeiting problem, you
really sort of have to give these guys credit for the creativity displayed."91
Today, China holds a seat as the global leader in copyright, patent, and
trademark infringing goods, 92 and estimates put the market value of its IPinfringing goods between $19 billion and $24 billion a year93 (8% of its GDP),
costing the companies that produce the originals tens of billions of dollars in
lost sales worldwide. 94 In China, some 40,000 wholesale shops sell about
100,000 products, 90 percent of which are fake.95 On the home front, the
USTR estimates that some 80% of IP-infringing goods seized at U.S. borders

trying to date the ETC, romantically that is, it would be reasonable to conclude that the EU is
sending mixed signals.
88 Okay, so China isn’t little at all; but how can one pass up the opportunity to
reference a classic 80s movie featuring Kurt Russell and a young Kim Cattrall when writing a
piece that deals with China. BIG TROUBLE IN LITTLE CHINA (Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp. 1986).
89 The Sincerest Form of Flattery, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2007, at 64-5.
90 Philip Cohen, Dozens of Human Embryos Cloned in China, NEW SCIENTIST (Mar. 6,
2002), http://www.new
scientist.com/article/dn2012-dozens-of-human-embryos-cloned-in-china.html.
91 Justin Rohrlich, China Officially Almost Out of Things to Counterfeit, Minyanville (Sept.
8, 2010), http://www.minyanville.com/dailyfeed/china-officially-almost-out-of/.
92
Ernie Siciliano, Faking It: China’s Slow Battle Against Counterfeiting (2007),
http://bionicteaching.com/journalism/?p=16; Caroline Dobson, China: World’s ‘Single Largest
Source’ of Counterfeit Goods, THE EPOCH TIMES, May 20-26, 2010, at A6, available at
http://epocharchive.com/
a1/en/us/was/2010/05%20%20May/20/A6_EET20100520-DCUS.pdf.
93 Counterfeiting and China’s Economic Development: Hearings Before the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, 109th Cong. 216 (2006) (testimony of Prof.
Daniel
C.
K.
Chow),
available
at
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/transcripts/june7_8/06_06_7_8_trans.pdf.
94
Ed Young, A 'Real' Steal, Brandchannel (Apr. 9, 2001),
http://www.brandchannel.com/features_effect.asp?pf_id=30; Jeffrey Hays, Pirating and
Counterfeiting
In
China
(2010),
http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid=356&catid=9&subcatid=61.
95
Mark Litke, China Big in Counterfeit Goods (Apr. 21, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=130381&page=1.
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come from Chinese exporters.96 Not surprisingly, China has had a rotating
seat on the USTR's "watch list" for years and has recently graduated to the
"priority watch list" [for whatever that's worth97]. Still, infringers remain so
brazen that one of the most popular markets in China for knock-offs is
located right across the street from the U.S. Embassy.98
As mentioned supra, the modern knock-off regime extends far beyond
Gucci sunglasses and Rolex watches; however, the extreme to which China
has taken the copycat industry borders on the artistic. To illustrate, consider
the following items that Chinese knock-off artisans have passed off as the real
McCoy: Honda and Yamaha Motorcycles;99 Porsches;100 Ferraris;101 BMWs;102
space equipment (inadvertently purchased by NASA); 103 military electronic
systems for high-tech weaponry (inadvertently purchased by the U.S.
Army); 104 baby formula; 105 The Snuggie; 106 industrial mining pumps; 107
Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurants;108 American Standard Toilets;109 Head &
Shoulders shampoo;110 Skippy peanut butter;111 and yes fellas - even Viagra.112

Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., 2010 Special 301 Rep. at 19 (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1906.
97 Several countries do not take the U.S. Trade Representative's (USTR) watch lists
very seriously. For example, Canadian politicians have told the U.S. that Canada "does not
recognize the 301 watch list process" because it "lacks reliable and objective analysis," and
that since 4.3 billion people live in countries that the USTR finds problematic, perhaps the
problem is with the U.S., rather than those other countries. Mike Masnick, USTR Announces
What Countries Have Been Naughty When It Comes To Intellectual Property (Apr. 30,
2010), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100430/1153579257.shtml; see also Mike Masnick,
Human Rights Groups Complain About Special 301 Process (July 19, 2010),
http://gamma.server
box.net/blog.php?tag=special+301&edition=techdirt.
Further, commentators have noted that in the past (through Reagan, G.H.W. Bush,
Clinton, and G.W. Bush presidencies), that the list has been deeply biased, that is, basically an
edited version of one-sided submissions from a handful of corporate lobby groups
representing the pharmaceutical, entertainment and publishing industries, reviewed by an
advisory board made up entirely of lobbyists for these same industries. James Love, Thailand
and Medicine Patents: An Early Test for Obama Trade Policy, HUFFINGTON POST (2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-love/thailand-and-medicine-pat_b_173839.html.
98 Litke, supra note 95.
99 Phonies galore, ECONOMIST, Nov. 10, 2001, at 58; see also Litke, supra note 95.
100 Knock-offs catch on, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2010, at 81-2 [hereinafter Knock-offs catch on].
101 Id.
102 Rohrlich, supra note 91.
103 Knock-offs catch on, supra note 100.
104 Id.
105 Nicholas Schmidle, Inside the Knockoff Factory, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at 38.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Rohrlich, supra note 91.
109 Litke, supra note 95.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
96
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A. Grasshopper! To The Mountain Fortress!
If ever a word has evolved in meaning, it is "Shanzhai." Literal
translations include "mountain village,"113 "a fenced place in the forest" and
"villages in the mountain that have stockade houses." 114 However, it was
during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when Chinese authors were
anonymously publishing (for political reasons) tons of "cops and robbers"
novels 115 that the term began to take on its contemporary meaning. The
outlaws in these stories were painted as righteous good guys operating from
mountain strongholds (Shanzhai), and the corrupt imperial officials were cast
as the villains.116 Thus, the term was adopted by these authors as a metaphor,
either to highlight corrupted authority vis-a-vis their purportedly justified acts,
or "simply to describe the lack of state control."117
However, with that history as a backdrop, Shanzhai began to refer to a
new category of products with the help of Cantonese slang.118 Many of the
knock-off factories in operation today originated from Shenzhen (Guangzhou
province, China), where they started as low-end family-owned factories 119
operating in little wood houses on the hills around the Cantonese area. 120
Eventually, people started calling them Shanzhai factories and their products
Shanzhai products,121 and the similar pronunciation of Shenzhen and Shanzhai
contributed to the association of the products to the region. 122 Finally,
because of the low economic status of the area, Shanzhai became a term used
to suggest something cheap or inferior.123
Today though, with the help of the Internet, the term has come to
represent a "certain Chinese cleverness and ingenuity."124 For multitudes of
Chinese, "Shanzhai Culture" represents a lifestyle "from the grass roots and
for the grass roots" giving people "another choice and the possibility of
113 Xiaobo Wu & Wei Zhang, Business Model Innovations in China: From a Value
Network
Perspective
(2009),
http://www.indiana.edu/~rccpb/uschinacooperation/papers/P8%20Wu%20Xiaobo.pdf.
114 Philipp Boeing, Shanzhai – Dimensions of a Chinese Phenomenon (2009),
http://www.frankfurtschool.de/content/en/ecbc/ecbc_portal/content_files/file33/CBR2009_001_Boeing_shanz
hai.pdf.
115 William O. Hennessey, Sixth Annual Baker Botts Lecture: Protection of Intellectual
Property in China (30 Years and More): A Personal Reflection, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1257, 1262 (2009).
116 Id.
117 Sky Canaves & Juliet Ye, Imitation Is the Sincerest Form of Rebellion in China, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 22, 2009, at A1.
118 Boeing, supra note 114.
119 Id.
120
CHINA'S SHANZHAI CULTURE - ORIGIN, SHANZHAI PRODUCTS AND
IMPLICATIONS, http://www.targetchinese.com/targetpedia/chinas-shanzhai-culture-originshanzhai-products-and-implications/.
121 Id.
122 Boeing, supra note 114.
123 Canaves & Ye, supra note 117.
124 Id.
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resisting dominant cultural values."125
However, to fully appreciate the resistance towards dominant cultural
values requires a basic understanding of the ideologies that have led to the
Shanzhai phenomenon.
V. UNDERSTANDING THEIR DEAL
Some commentators make simplistic conclusions about China's
enforcement failures 126 rather than attempting to understand "the complex
reasons for Chinese inability or reticence to enforce obligations they seem to
have accepted willingly."127 Others chalk the failures up to China's communist
rule and censorship, positing that respect for IP in such an environment is farfetched.128 However, real clarity129 on IPR enforcement in China requires an
understanding of the traditional ideologies that inform contemporary Chinese
attitudes.
A. Confucius Say…
China's leaders have never been big on giving credit to (much less
protecting the rights of) China's innovators, whether in the realm of
technology or popular arts. 130 In fact, it wasn't until 1979 that China even
publicly recognized the concept of IP,131 which given its history of multiple
dynasties spanning thousands of years,132 is kind of unbelievable. Maybe that
doesn't seem like a big deal, but think about it this way. England, for
example, is a baby compared to China, the Kingdom of England being
established as a nation state in 927 A.D.,133 the Kingdom of Great Britain in
1707.134 Yet as early as 1710, Great Britain enacted the Statute of Anne, 135
Id.
See M.D. Pendelton, Chinese Intellectual Property - Some Global Implications for Legal
Culture and National Sovereignty, 4 EURO. INTELL. PROP. REV. 119, 119-121 (1993) (noting in
reference to China that countries do not have the right to cheat in matters of international
trade and if they do, then like a dishonest merchant, they must be coerced into compliance).
127 Assafa Endeshaw, Commentary: A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China Conflict on
Intellectual Property, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 295, 335 (1996).
128
Alex Newman, Communist Pirates Staling for Censorship? (Jan. 7, 2010),
http://www.jbs.org/jbs-news-feed/5821-communist-pirates-stealing-for-censorship.
129 As one scholar has noted, such clarity requires "an understanding of traditional
public attitudes in Chinese society toward innovators and artistic creators (mostly indifferent
if not negative), the extent to which those attitudes have changed (or not changed) over time,
and how far China has yet to go in recognizing the IP rights of authors, entrepreneurs, and
inventors." Hennessey, supra note 115, at 1260.
130 See generally id.
131 See Roderick MacFarquhar, The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1962-82, in
THE POLITICS OF CHINA 278, 315-20 (Roderick MacFarquhar ed., 2d ed. 1997).
132 See generally JOHN KING FAIRBANK, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY (1992); see also China
History Table (2010), http://www.history-of-china.com.
133 BARBARA YORKE, KINGS AND KINGDOMS OF EARLY ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND
96 (1990).
134 KENNETH O. MORGAN, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF BRITAIN 672 (2010).
125
126

135
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which vested every author with the exclusive right to make copies of his or
her works.136 Likewise, the U.S., declaring independence from the Kingdom
of Great Britain as recently as 1776, had its first copyright law, influenced by
the Statute of Anne, as early as 1790.137 So comparatively speaking, China's
lag time is quite monumental.
In China, the philosophies behind recognizing innovation stand in
harsh contrast to the principles informing those of most other countries,
which range from incentivizing creativity138 for the enrichment of the public
domain 139 to rewarding individual creators economically for their efforts. 140
As one expert noted, there is a notion in China that innovations should be
viewed as "a social enterprise rather than … breakthroughs by individual
geniuses." 141 This conception originates from an idea prevalent in one of
China's most influential philosophical traditions, Confucianism, that is, "that
learning must be transmitted from master to student and, consequently, that
there must exist a master to be credited for the student's achievements - the
student being validated among his or her own peers only by the master's
favor."142
However, validation hasn't been easy to come by in China. A prime
example is the traditional Confucian hierarchical society of the Han Dynasty
(206 B.C. - A.D. 220),143 in which there were four classes of people, that is (in
order of status), scholars, farmers, artisans, and merchants. 144 The elite
scholar officials defined what was an "accepted literary form," which was
usually something very traditional, something they were good at, like poetry or
calligraphy. 145 The commoners' contributions (for example, ceramics,
music/songs, drama, storytelling, architecture, etc.), which were more akin to
what would be considered art today, were looked down upon as mere
"entertainment." 146 In fact, even technology was considered "nonsense." 147
LIONEL BENTLY, UMA SUTHERSANEN & PAUL TORREMANS, GLOBAL
COPYRIGHT: THREE HUNDRED YEARS SINCE THE STATUTE OF ANNE, FROM 1709 TO
CYBERSPACE 1 (2010).
136 Id. at 2.
137 EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 15 (2000).
138 RONAN DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT: HISTORY, THEORY, LANGUAGE
139 (2006).
139 Id. at 83.
140 Id. at 4 n14.
141 Nathan Sivin, Introduction to 6 JOSEPH NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILISATION IN
CHINA, pt. VI, at 1, 1 (Nathan Sivin ed., 2000).
142 Hennessey, supra note 115, at 1270.
143 FAIRBANK, supra note 132, at 47.
144 Id. at 108.
145 Hennessey, supra note 115, at 1270.
146 Id.
147 See JOSEPH R. LEVENSON, THE PROBLEM OF INTELLECTUAL CONTINUITY 13
(1968) (noting that traditional Chinese scholars did not consider scientific discovery
prestigious); see also Hennessey, supra note 115, at 1278-9 (noting that under traditional
Confucian ideology, technological advances and popular literary creations did not merit
cultural or legal recognition, and pointing out that the Old Chinese bureaucrat could express
no interest or recognize value in such "nonsense").
135
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Every once in a while, the pop culture of the commoners (who were known
as "artisans," never "artists") would come to the attention of the scholar elite
and would be converted into an accepted literary form, 148 but the original
creators were rarely, if ever, credited.149
To be sure, this is but one example from one dynasty in a string of
dynasties that has spanned hundreds of years. Nonetheless, multiple changes
in power over the centuries have seemed only to ossify the disconnect
between China's rulers and its innovators. 150 Striving for ideals of social
stability, Chinese aristocracy has fought the notions of change and originality,
opting for social forms "in line with Confucian ideology" and "family
values." 151 The quest for social harmony through a "top-down approach"
(akin to listening to elders) continued to foster atmospheres hardly conducive
to "stirring things up or 'new ideas,'" 152 which inevitably (and perhaps
catastrophically153) has colored modern Chinese attitudes toward IP.154
B. The Orient Express
Until TRIPs became an integral part of the international trade regime,
the main problem that any industrial power would have with another country
was whether the other country had promulgated adequate IP laws. 155
Incidentally, China's fast track creation of an IP regime over the past thirty
years has been pretty amazing.156
While Chinese IP law passed through various stages of infancy
beginning as early as 1904,157 it was given a sudden thrust in the 1980s, in line
with economic reforms, the intent being "to neutralize any misgivings of the
industrialized countries about the weakness or inadequacy of China's IP
laws."158 In March 1984, China's National People's Congress passed the first
comprehensive Chinese patent law.159 In 1985, China acceded to the Paris
Convention, and the Chinese Patent office signed its first agreement for
148 Hennessey, supra note 115, at 1272 (noting that as China's urban society grew, a
new form of scholarly elite lyric poetry developed, the subjects of which were often popular
customs the officials encountered among the commoners).
149 Id.
150 See generally id.
151 Id. at 1275.
152 Id.
153 RAY HUANG, 1587, A YEAR OF NO SIGNIFICANCE 221 (1981) (calling Old China
a "highly stylized society wherein the roles of individuals were thoroughly restricted by a body
of simple yet ill-defined moral precepts," and noting that "the empire was seriously hampered
in its development, regardless of the noble intention behind those precepts").
154 Hennessey, supra note 115, at 1280.
155 Endeshaw, supra note 127, at 305.
156 Hennessey, supra note 115, at 1281.
157 Endeshaw, supra note 127, at 310.
158 Id.
159 Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective April 1, 1985), 1984 FAGUI HUIBIAN
529, available at http://iprchina.blogspot.com/2009/10/patent-law-1984.html.
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international cooperation.160 It joined the Madrid Agreement Concerning the
International Registration of Marks in 1989 and Berne in 1992.161 With a few
exceptions, China's IP laws enacted pursuant to its entry into WTO in 2001
are compliant with the minimum standards of TRIPS,162 and today its laws are
nearly, if not completely, in conformity with its WIPO obligations. 163 In
short, in a span of ten years, China promulgated the entire gamut of IP laws,
with constant revisions at all stages.164
However, bad IP protection won't disappear just because there are
laws or treaty obligations; the adoption of laws is a good place to start,165 but
naturally, the inquiry next turns to states' commitment to enforcement. 166
Therefore, it will be helpful at this point to briefly analyze complaining IPR
holders' avenues of recourse, both judicial and administrative, and the
mechanisms in place for the enforcement of judgments.
VI. CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM FOR DUMMIES
China has a developing legal system that is weak in many respects
compared to legal systems in advanced industrialized countries.167 Generally

160 See European Patent Office, China and Korea, http://www.epo.org/aboutus/office/international-relations/projects/china.html (discussing the June 1985 agreement
between the EPO and "the former Chinese Patent Office"); WIPO, Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property: Accession by the People's Republic of China (Dec. 19,
1984), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/paris/treaty_paris_114.html (denoting
China's date of accession to the Paris Convention).
161 See, e.g., WIPO, Status of Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks (Jul. 15, 2009),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/madrid_marks.pdf
(recognizing China as a party to the Madrid Agreement as of October 4, 1989); WIPO, Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: Contracting Parties, http://
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (recognizing China as a
party to the Berne Convention as of October 15, 1992).
162 See Guo Shoukang & Zuo Xiaodong, Are Chinese Intellectual Property Laws Consistent
With the TRIPS Agreement?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRIPS COMPLIANCE IN CHINA
11-12 (Paul Torremans et al. eds., 2007) (discussing amendments to Chinese IP laws to
comply with TRIPS); see also Panel Report, China - Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R, at 7.72-.139 (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter
PANEL REPORT] (concluding that China's copyright law violates the TRIPS Agreement
because it does not protect "prohibited works"). After the WTO panel decision, China
"pledged . . . to cooperate with other countries to strengthen its protection of copyrights and
trademarks." China Vows Copyright Cooperation After WTO Case, REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSTRE50Q1NX20090127. However, a
second ruling of the panel was that China's regulations on the release of seized counterfeit
goods were not compliant with TRIPS Article 46. PANEL REPORT, supra, at 7.395.
163 Hennessey, supra note 115, at 1288.
164 Endeshaw, supra note 127, at 311.
165 Id. at 299.
166 Id.
167 See Pirates of the 21st Century: The Curse of the Black Market, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Mgmt., the Fed. Workforce, and D.C. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec.
and Governmental Aff., 108th Cong. 22-23 (2004) (testimony of Daniel C.K. Chow, Law Prof.,
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speaking, enforcement of China's IP laws is inadequate and fails to create
sufficient deterrence to counterfeiting and piracy.168
China enforces IP rights through both administrative and judicial
proceedings.169 According to one authority, while the administrative track has
proven decent, the judicial track is a nightmare. 170 The following illustrates
the grounds for that sentiment.
In terms of state structure, the Chinese Supreme People's Court (SPC)
is not a co-equal branch of the Chinese government, 171 but, rather, is
supervised directly by the National People's Congress, and indirectly through
the promulgation of regulations and guidelines by the State Council,172 which
is charged with "administration on the basis of law."173 Currently, there is no
mechanism for judicial review of such regulations or guidelines to determine if
they have been drafted "on the basis of law".174 Plus, provincial governments
can enact their own laws and regulations that may have the same effect as
those issued directly by the State Council,175 and it is not entirely clear what
happens if the two are at odds.176
However, since 2001, particularly in IP cases, the SPC has issued a
series of judicial interpretations that are presumably binding on the lower
courts,177 and decisions of the most important courts178 that hear numerous IP
cases may be influential.179 Still, the bulk of published judicial opinions carry
Ohio State Univ.) [hereinafter Pirates of the 21st Century], available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=7cc7d588-c422-4ac4-9e06-216a9e66a2ce.
168 Id.
169 PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 16 (2d ed. 2003).
170 Compared to the impressive achievements that have been made in IP lawmaking, the enforcement of IP could be described as unsatisfactory if not dismal or in crisis.
See JIANQIANG NIE, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA
217-18 (2006).
171 Id. at 244-45.
172 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 198-99 (2d. ed. 2009) (describing the hierarchy of the Chinese government).
173 The desire for formal legal legitimation of the exercise of the state's
administrative power is captured by the slogan "administration according to law." JOHN
GILLESPIE & PIP NICHOLSON, ASIAN SOCIALISM & LEGAL CHANGE: THE DYNAMICS OF
VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE REFORM 212 (Matthew May ed., 2005).
174 See NIE, supra note 170, at 245 (2006).
175 Id. at 246 ("The court has no judicial power to interpret the local regulations, or
the administrative regulations and rules.").
176 Hennessey, supra note 115, at 1294.
177 FENG, supra note 169, at 9-10 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that "law is a diluted concept
in China and comes from a variety of sources, e.g., an IP right can be instituted by a national
law, its ancillary administrative regulations, or related judicial interpretations - all of which are
proper legal rules; and the Constitution is not a direct source of enforceable rights, but rather
constitutes programmatic or ideological declarations").
178 An example of such a court is the Intermediate People's Courts in Beijing.
Hennessey, supra note 115, at 1294.
179 See FENG, supra note 169, at 9-10 (observing that the publication of exemplary
cases serves as judicial guidance, supervision, and further training for judges).
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no precedential weight whatsoever.180
Finally, judicial officials are only theoretically independent of local
governments,181 and judges, even in their own courts, are not higher in rank
than prosecutors from the local branch of the Supreme People's
Procuratorate,182 which among other tasks, performs "legal supervision over
judicial proceedings." 183 The professional qualifications of judges, while
advancing, vary widely with distance from urban centers; 184 and "home court"
advantages abound, with recent evidence indicating that corruption of judicial
officials may be extremely prevalent.185
Yet, judicial qualifications are getting better and IP rights are at the
forefront of priorities in China's judicial system, 186 so it is reasonable to
conclude that IP protection has a bright future in China. But if perceptions of
illegitimacy deter IPR holders' choice to pursue judicial recourse, there is
another option.
Because of inadequacies in China's judicial channels, including the
slow and expensive nature of pursuing IP infringement claims through such
channels, 187 many IPR holders turn to China's administrative agencies for
relief.188 However, while these agencies have the power to order the cessation
of infringing acts and are authorized to confiscate and destroy the infringing

See id. at 33 ("As in most civil law jurisdictions, judgments of the People's Court
are not precedents.").
181 Hennessey, supra note 115, at 1294.
182 See generally Legal System of China, LawInfo China (2011),
http://www.lawinfochina.com/legal/
Display_2.asp; see also Judicial Protection of IPR in China: The Organization, Functions and
Powers of the People's Courts, China IPR Law (2011), http://www.chinaiprlaw.com
/english/courts/court1.htm.
183 Supreme People's Procuratorate of China, News Guangdong (May 14, 2003),
http://www.newsgd.com/government/govdepart/200305140343.htm.
184 Brad Luo, Economic Crisis Tests China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, CHINA BUSINESS
LAW BLOG, http://www.chinabusinesslaw.blogspot.com.
185 In a recent report on bribery, data indicated that 11% of 148 bribery reports it
received on China from July 2007 to June 2008 involved judicial officials. Trace Int'l,
Business Registry for International Bribery and Extortion: China Report 1 (July 15, 2008),
available at https://secure.traceinternational.org/news/pdf/China_PR_and_Report.pdf.
186 U.S. Embassy Beijing, IP Toolkit, http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/
copyright.html [hereinafter IP Toolkit].
187 Ryan Ong, Tackling Intellectual Property Infringement in China, CHINA BUS. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 17, available at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/
public/0903/ong.html.
188 Id.; Godfrey Firth, IP Protection Best Practice Tips, CHINA BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2006,
at 18, available at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/
public/0601/firth.html; Rouse Sophia Hou, Increasingly Litigious IP Owners Change Enforcement
Landscape, CHINA L. & PRAC., Dec.-Jan. 2009-10, at 11, available at
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/2351743/Channel/9937/Increasinglylitigious-IP-owners-change-enforcement-landscape.html (describing administrative action as
the usual "first line of attack" against infringers).
180
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goods and any instruments used to manufacture them,189 most IPR holders
find that infringers are often back in business almost immediately following a
shut-down. 190 In addition, these agencies issue laughably small fines and
award meager damages amounts 191 that rather than deterring infringers, are
viewed by them as the cost of doing business.192 This scenario is a product of
the purpose of compensation in the present system, which is to award the
rights holder the profits earned by the counterfeiter after deducting all
expenses (as represented by the counterfeiter!) and is not based upon
economic losses suffered. 193 Therefore, taking the administrative route is
unlikely to curb the disgruntled IPR holder's frustrations.

JONATHAN REUVID & YONG LI, DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA 158-9 (5th ed.
2006); see also Thomas Stiebel, Hillary Wucherer & Karen Dickinson, Chinese Counterfeit
Goods - How to Protect Your Firm (2010), http://www.asiapacific
forum.com/sub/sub_news/ns_20100108_counter.html.
190 Allison Jackson, Counterfeiting in China Thrives Despite Crackdowns, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Jan. 4, 2010, LEXIS, News Library (noting that "You can easily get a raid but there
are no consequences to the counterfeiter, who usually pays a light fine and is back in business
in two to three weeks.").
191 Some statistics of one such agency, the State Administration of Industry and
Commerce (SAIC) (which is responsible for the enforcement of Chinese Trademark Law,
Anti-Unfair Competition Law for the Protection of Consumers’ Rights and Interests, and
Advertising Law) prove illustrative of this point. See generally STATE ADMINISTRATION OF
INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE OF THE PRC (2010),
http://www.saic.gov.cn/english/aboutus/Mission/. According to enforcement statistics
reported by SAIC, 22,001 complaints were filed in 2000 and the average fine imposed on a
counterfeiter or infringer at that time was $794. Moreover, the average amount of
compensation (that is, damages) awarded to the complaining rights holder was $19! In 2005,
while the number of complainants more than doubled (49,412), the average fine only
increased to $1017, the average amount of compensation awarded to the complaining rights
holder being $40. In addition, according to the most recent data, while complaints in 2008
reached a high of 56,634, the average fine imposed on the infringer saw hardly any increase,
rising to a mere $1,212. Data on compensation awarded to complainants is not available
beyond 2006, however at that time $53 was the average. Daniel Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting
Strategies of Multi-National Companies in China: How a Flawed Approach is Making Counterfeiting
Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 749, 757 (2010) [hereinafter Multi-National Companies in China]
(discussing the annual reports of the State Intellectual Property Office of the PRC (SIPO)); see
also State Intellectual Property Office of the PRC, Annual Reports (2009-10) [hereinafter PRC
Reports], http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/zfxxgk/ndbg/.
192 Ong, supra note 187, at 17.
193 See, e.g., Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised) (Zhonghua
Renmin Gonghe Guo Shangbiao Fa (Xiuzhen), Di Sanshiba Tiao) (adopted at the 24th
Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress on Aug. 23, 1982,
revised by the 30th Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's
Congress on Feb. 22, 1993, and effective Jul. 1, 1993, and revised for the second time
according to the Decision on the Amendment of the Trademark Law of the People's
Republic of China adopted at the 24th Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth
National People's Congress on Oct. 27, 2001), art. 56 (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws11.htm; see also Pirates of the 21st Century, supra
note 167.
189
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A. No Jail For You!
According to present practices, administrative authorities are to
transfer cases that involve criminal liability to judicial authorities for criminal
prosecution. 194 Standards for criminal liability are set forth in the Chinese
Criminal Law of 1997.195 According to Article 140, a producer or distributor
of infringing goods with sales between $6,000 and $24,000 is to be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of up to two years and must also pay fines, 196 the
severity of the criminal punishment increasing accordingly with increases in
the level of sales.197 However, as is illustrated by statistics provided by China's
State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), 198 the rates of
prosecutions are much too low to serve as a meaningful deterrent;199 and thus,
as things stand, a career infringer has a pretty decent shot at avoiding criminal
liability under the present system.
The low criminal prosecution rate can be attributed in part to the
reluctance of administrative authorities to transfer cases to judicial
authorities. 200 The agencies expend time and resources in conducting raids
and seizures, and although the fines issued are low, all potential for collection
is eliminated when cases are transferred.201 In addition, because of evidentiary
requirements, an agency is required to give judicial authorities all confiscated
products and machinery - items that might otherwise be sold at a public
auction and provide revenue for the agency.202 Moreover, under current PRC
practices, the evidentiary bar for criminal cases is high, requiring physical
evidence of completed transactions in the form of sales orders, sales receipts,

194 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [Criminal Law of the P.R.C.], arts.
141-8 (1997) [hereinafter Criminal Law of the P.R.C.], reprinted in Zhonghua RENMIN
GONGHEGUO XING FA (Renmin Chubanshe 1997), available at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207320.htm; see also Pirates of the 21st Century,
supra note 167.
195 See Criminal Law of the P.R.C., supra note 194.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 For example, in 2001, the number of cases transferred by administrative agencies
for criminal prosecutions was a mere 86 out of 22,813. That's 1 transfer for every 265 cases.
In 2003, as the number of cases rose to 26,488, the number of transfers actually dropped by
almost half to 45, which is 1 transfer for every 589 cases. And while the most recent data
indicates a rise in transfers, that is, 137 in 2008, this number must be considered in light of the
drastic increase in the number of cases (56,634), which makes the number of transfers a
measly 1 in every 413 cases. Multi-National Companies in China, supra note 192 (discussing the
annual reports of the State Intellectual Property Office of the PRC (SIPO)); see also PRC
Reports, supra note 191.
199 Ong, supra note 187, at 17; see also Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
200 NIE, supra note 170, at 225; see also Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
201 See id.
202 See id. See also IP Toolkit, supra note 186 (noting that administrative agencies may
have a financial incentive to adjudicate cases that are more appropriate for criminal
prosecution because the administrative fines paid by the respondent go to the coffers of the
administrative agency).
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ledger and account books, and tax documents;203 and counterfeit goods seized
on the premises, packaging, or equipment used in illegal manufacture, no
matter how large the quantity, are not considered evidence of sales. 204
Physical records of illegal activities are rarely if ever kept, and thus, gathering
probative evidence has proven to be a formidable obstacle for most IPR
holders.205
Another reason for the low criminal prosecution rate is the growing
sophistication of infringers. 206 For example, because thresholds exist
delineating which offenses subject infringers to criminal liability, many
infringers maintain supplies (and thus sales) at a level just under minimum
thresholds.207 In addition, infringers are increasingly seeking legal advice and
have begun to use legal weapons to protect themselves.208 For example, many
have initiated administrative reviews and commenced lawsuits against their
local agency, which not only creates a burden for the agency in terms of time
and manpower, but also damages its reputation. 209 Moreover, in order to
avoid the risk of being sued for wrongdoing, procedurally or substantively,
agencies have responded by taking action only in the most clear cut cases.210
This pattern is further exasperated by the agency officials who, without legal
backgrounds, are not confident to take action that might be the subject of
dispute. 211 Thus, from the perspective of many infringers, the prospect of
continuing with impunity to flood the market with infringing products
remains a tempting one.212
See, e.g., IP Toolkit, supra note 186 (noting that "Many foreign rights holders
complain that the criteria for referral of criminal cases are too vague, permit too much
discretion, and that the minimum evidentiary threshold for prosecution is too high."); see also
Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
204 See Keys To Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights In China (2008),
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/
current.php?artType=view&artMonth=January&artYear=2011&EntryNo=9144 (noting that
criminal cases require high thresholds and direct evidence of criminal activity); see also Douglas
Clark, Counterfeiting in China: A Blueprint for Change, CHINA BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 14
(noting the extreme difficulty in locating and obtaining evidence against counterfeiters); and
Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
205 Betsy Lowther, No End for China’s Counterfeiting Contagion (2004),
http://www.betsylowther.com/counter1.html (discussing that under current law, only
violators with extremely high monetary amounts of counterfeit activity are punished in
criminal courts which is difficult for police and brand owners to prove since records are rarely
kept by pirates; and pointing out that the monetary thresholds are currently calculated on the
infringer’s prices, almost always much lower than the legitimate product); see also Pirates of the
21st Century, supra note 167.
206 See generally Hou, supra note 188; see also Loke-Khoon Tan, Anti-counterfeiting: The
Law Now, in 2010 and Beyond, CHINA L. & PRAC., June 2007, at 1 [hereinafter 2010 and Beyond]
(noting that around 80-90% of counterfeiting cases are dealt with by administrative bodies).
207 2010 and Beyond, supra note 206, at 2 (noting that counterfeiters circumvent rules
by maintaining inventories below threshold amounts and proposing the removal of such
thresholds).
208 Hou, supra note 188.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
203
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VII. WITHIN YOU, WITHOUT YOU
Because ACTA's scope is not limited to matters of domestic
infringement, 213 the following section will examine new hurdles facing IPR
enforcement in China, namely, the elimination of the state monopoly on
export rights,214 the role of the internet,215 and China's efforts to reduce goodsentry requirements with its trading partners.216
In 2003, to fulfill its pledges to the WTO, China amended its foreign
trade laws to give individuals import and export rights, which were once the
sole domain of powerful state monopolies.217 Prior to the amendment, only
designated state trading companies could lawfully engage in trade with other
countries. 218 As a result, if infringers wanted a piece of the international
market, they were limited to the state trading companies willing to work with
them.219 Granted, as pre-2003 seizure statistics stand to prove,220 there were a
plethora of such companies; however, in removing the costs and hassles
associated with finding them, the amendments have made the export of illegal
goods a more attractive option to infringers.221
In addition to the elimination of export restrictions, the Internet has

See ACTA October 2010 Draft, supra note 74, at 9.
James P. Zumwalt, How WTO Membership Affects China, in 7, No.1 Economic
Perspectives: An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Dept. of State - Trade in the Post-Doha
Global Economy 14 (2002); Individuals to Get Import-Export Rights (2002),
http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-01/06/content_295915.htm (discussing
amendments to the nation's then decade-old Foreign Trade Law); see also Chinese Marketing
& Communications, http://www.china-britain.org/sistem_china/6_exporting.html
(discussing the Chinese government move to dismantle the near monopoly on import-export
rights previously enjoyed by a few state-owned firms).
215 See generally Traffic Report: Online Piracy and Counterfeiting, MarkMonitor Inc.
(Jan. 2011) [hereinafter Traffic Report], http://www.markmonitor.com/
download/report/MarkMonitor_-_Traffic_Report_110111.pdf (identifying a sample of rogue
internet sites that are responsible for trafficking counterfeit and pirated goods); John Leyden,
Faking It: Internet Fuels Trade in Counterfeit Goods (July 28, 2005 11:46 GMT),
http://www.theregister
.co.uk/2005/07/28/gieschen_counterfeit_report/ (noting that in addition to entertainment,
software, clothing and accessories, the internet is also widely used as a forum for selling
forged financial and identification documentation).
216 Scott M. Flicker & Hamilton Loeb, Opening the Door to Freer Trade with China,
CHINA MATTERS (Hastings’ Newsletter for Investing & Operating in the P.R.C.) Sept. 2006
[hereinafter Hastings’ Newsletter], available at
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/571.pdf.
217 Individuals to Get Import-Export Rights, supra note 214.
218 See Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
219 Id.
220 Interpol - First Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting, The Impact And
Scale of Counterfeiting (2004), http://www.interpol.int/Public/News/2004/
Factsheet51PR21.asp (noting that 66% of counterfeit goods seized in Europe in 2002 came
from Asia, Thailand and China in particular).
221 See Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
213
214
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become an increasingly popular tool for infringers. 222 The prevalence of the
internet in the world's daily activities, combined with rapid download speeds,
the perfection of digital copies, the boom in e-commerce and the complexity
of policing online transactions, 223 has made trade in illegal goods 224 an
operation capable of being run from the privacy of one's home.225 Moreover,
the policies of many sites (for example, auction sites like eBay) often create
significant and frustrating hurdles 226 for IPR holders to quell rampant IP
theft.227
Finally, China is actively engaged in free trade agreement ("FTA")
negotiations with trading partners old and new to procure more flexible trade
terms than those imposed by its membership under the WTO. 228 These
222 Traffic Report, supra note 215, at 9 (noting that while counterfeiting and piracy in
the physical world are serious problems, the issues are "growing at a significant rate online
and pose unique challenges in remediation, due to the inherent nature of the internet with its
global reach, cost efficiencies, and anonymity").
223 Id.; B. C. Tan, Anti-counterfeiting Initiatives: Internet Distribution, WORLD-CHECK
(2009), http://www.world-check.com/media/d/content_industryvoices_
reference/IndustryVoices_Jun09_v.1_18.6.09.pdf (discussing how the low risks attributed to
the high levels of anonymity result in ideal conditions for the sale of illegal goods over the
internet; and pointing out that because a significant proportion of infringers distribute very
small volumes of goods and because the number of small-scale vendors increases on a daily
basis, the enforcement costs of taking action against every infringer will eventually become
prohibitive).
224 For example, a 2011 study of 10 major media brands identifying 43 unique sites
as "digital piracy" centers found that the traffic generated to the sites was over 146 million
visits per day, representing more than 53 billion visits per year. The combined traffic to 48
sites selling counterfeit goods identified in the study is more than 240,000 visits per day on
average or more than 87 million visits per year. Traffic Report, supra note 215, at 5.
225 Maura Kutner, The Fight Against Fakes Online, HARPER'S BAZAAR, Dec. 14, 2010,
available at http://www.harpersbazaar.com/fashion/fashion-articles/fight-against-fakesonline-0111 (discussing a young mother from a suburb of San Francisco who recently found
herself in court for selling counterfeit handbags from her home via the internet).
226 For instance, in 2004, Tiffany & Co. sued eBay for contributory trademark
infringement after users were selling fake Tiffany wares on the site. In 2010, the 2nd U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals, agreeing with a 2008 lower court ruling that it was not eBay’s job to
monitor and prevent the sale of infringing products, said that eBay was not liable because,
among other things, eBay will remove auctions of bogus goods "upon request." Global
Intellectual Property Center, Global Anti-Counterfeiting Efforts Set To Rise Further (2010)
[hereinafter Global Anti-Counterfeiting Efforts], http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/news/globalanti-counterfeiting-efforts-set-rise-further; see also David Kravets, Appeals Court Sides With eBay
in Tiffany Trademark Suit, WIRED, Apr. 1, 2010 [hereinafter Tiffany Trademark Suit], available at
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/
04/ebay-trademark-flap/ (discussing a similar legal battle that is playing out in the lower
courts in a $1 billion copyright lawsuit brought against Google by Viacom).
227 See Tiffany Trademark Suit, supra note 226; see also Global Anti-Counterfeiting Efforts,
supra note 226 (discussing that social networking sites such as Facebook are new outlets for
such sales, as are virtual gaming worlds such as Second Life).
228 See Yang Jiang, China's Free Trade Agreements and Implications for the WTO 5, paper
presented at the Int'l Studies Ass'n 49th Annual Convention, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES,
Hilton S.F., S.F., CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008, available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p250869_index.html (noting that China lists the slow
progress at the WTO as one of the reasons for its interest in FTAs and that it believes trade
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include the lessening of quantitative restrictions, customs requirements, and
other trade barriers for the importation of its goods.229 While the primary aim
of these efforts is firming up market access for legitimate Chinese goods, 230
the removal of impediments will likely also benefit the flow of illegal goods, as
they too will enter countries with less scrutiny. 231 Moreover, once illegal
goods enter these countries, they can then be transshipped to other
countries, 232 attenuating the source of the infringement and making the
potential for enforcement of IP rights less likely.233
VIII. SEA CHANGE
As evidenced by the running mantras of "enforcement" and
"cooperation" in the ACTA negotiations, there has been a switch in the
position of industrialized countries, the U.S. in particular, from insisting on
the availability of laws to the level of effectiveness of those laws.234 Repeated
threats of trade war by and against China,235 the perpetual signing of bilateral
agreements that go unenforced, 236 and the lack of clear and pronounced

liberalization among a small group of countries is easier to negotiate); see also generally Hastings’
Newsletter, supra note 216.
229 Id. at 207.
230 Id.
231 See Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
232 For a discussion on transshipping practices, see Marian Ladner, The Trials and
Tribulations of Transshipping, SHIPPING DIGEST, July 11, 2005, at 5, available at
http://ladnertradelaw.com/documents/publications/The%20Trials%20and%20Tribulations
%20of%20Transshipping.pdf; and for a discussion focusing on illegal transshipment practices,
see Brian Murphy & Roy Delbyck, What is Illegal Transshipment?, HONG KONG LAWYER, Jan.
1999, at 24, available at sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkjo/view/15/1502346.pdf.
233 Informed Trade Int'l, What is Transshipment? (2007),
http://www.itintl.com/what-is-transshipment.html (discussing transshipment as a commonly
used tool to disguise the point of origin of goods from Customs officials); see also United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment
178 (2010), http://www.unodc.org/documents/
data-and-analysis/tocta/8.Counterfeit_products.pdf (noting that Finding the source of any
given counterfeit in the labyrinth of potential sources can be a daunting task).
234 Endeshaw, supra note 127, at 305.
235 China and the United States have participated in a continuous cycle of threats of
sanctions, followed by negotiations, and resolutions. Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual
Property Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 335 (2006); See, e.g., David H.
Bernstein & Diane M. Glass, The Great Wall of China: Is It Still Standing in Wake of New Trade
Agreement?, N.Y.L.J., May 15, 1995, at 51; Tiffany Brown, U.S. Businessmen in China Welcome
Copyrights Agreement, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Feb. 27, 1995, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS
Database (noting that trade war could derail a planned one billion dollar auto assembly joint
venture between the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp. and both Ford and General
Motors); see also Evelyn Iritani, Boeing Likely Loser if U.S.-China Talks Fail, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24,
1995, at D1.
236 See US, China Sign Agreement, Trade War Averted, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR,
Feb. 26, 1995, LEXIS, World Library; see also A Lasting Trade Peace With China?, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 15, 1995, at 24 (reporting that China has made promises and signed agreements
before, only to renege on them or fail to enforce them).
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Chinese policies237 seem to have become the norm. Therefore, before even
reaching ACTA's substantive provisions, one has to wonder if China is among
the "like minded" trading partners mentioned in ACTA's statement of
purpose. The evidence suggests not, that is, to borrow a concept from
contracts, there just doesn't seem to be a "meeting of the minds" 238 with
China.
A. Perception and the Bug in the Rug239
Unlike in the U.S., IP protection in China today isn't perceived to be
about the rights of authors, inventors, and entrepreneurs; rather, it is all about
"economic development."240 The need for major economic development and
hence, the reason for China's individual perception of IP rights, was succinctly
summarized by one observer:
Why does China need this super fast economic
growth? While the country has made huge progress from the
1970s, when they had 250 million people living in extreme
poverty, they still have 29 million or so who are barely
subsisting. Additionally, the Chinese had a baby boom in the
early 1960s and an echo boom in the early 1980s, creating
demand for 25 million jobs or so a year, while the economy is
only creating about 10 million per year.241
Additionally, despite the country's booming economic development in
the past two decades, at the end of 2009, China had 35.97 million rural people
living below the internationally recognized poverty line, and as many as 150
237 Burton Levin, On Taiwan: Why Rock the Boat?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 19, 1995,
at 8 (suggesting that "the Chinese cling to their secretive ways and tend to see conspiracy all
around, particularly when the United States is involved.").
238 Aaron Larson, Contract Law - An Introduction, ExpertLaw (2003),
http://www.expertlaw.com/library/
business/contract_law.html.
239 The Bug in the Rug is an anecdote about changing one's perspective and seeing a
preexisting situation completely anew. Birdonmyshoulder*, The Bug in the Rug, EVERYTHING2
BLOG , http://everything2.com/title/the+bug+in+the+rug.
240 See generally Andrew T. Pham, IP Made in China - Real or Fake?, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY 30 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.iptoday.com/issues/2010/12/ip-made-inchina-real-or-fake.asp (noting that consistent with its economic growth, IP in China is more
about economic development than rights of innovators, which is unlikely to change in the
near future); see also RICHARD BAUM, BURYING MAO 57 (1994) (discussing the post-1976 era
in China and the idea of science and technology as "productive forces"); see also Chinese Premier
Meets U.S. Vice-President on Bilateral Ties, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 13, 1995, LEXIS,
News Library (containing the following statement by Premier Li to United States VicePresident Al Gore during the March 1995 environment conference in Berlin: "To China, the
supreme conviction is to develop [the] economy, improve the living standards of the people
and maintain a long stability . . . It is unrealistic and harmful to handle world affairs with the
wills and requirements of a certain country or country blocs.").
241 Posting of Jeff Bernstein, China Update - Olympian Challenges, to Urban Digs
(Apr. 14, 2008, 07:52 EST), http://www.urbandigs.com/2008/04/china_update_
olympian_challeng.html.
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million Chinese were actually living on less than $1.25 a day.242 In addition,
college graduates are not finding work. 243 Naturally, in light of these
conditions, the PRC fears that any downturn in China’s economic growth will
result in social and political upheavals.244
B. From Cobwebs to Cables245
As a result of the need for economic growth, China has developed
some bad habits. One such habit stems from China's unprecedented receipt
of foreign direct investment (FDI) from multi-national enterprises (MNE).246
Generally speaking, when an MNE wants to set up shop in China, in addition
to the capital that is injected, FDI often involves the transfer of patents,
copyrights, trademarks and other forms of IP.247 This IP is typically worth
much more than the capital necessary to establish a physical plant. 248 In
addition, MNEs often hire local scientists and engineers, teaching them how
Jin Zhu, China To Raise Poverty Line, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china/2010-10/28/content_11467561.htm.
243 In July, China’s Ministry of Education revealed that over 25 percent, or roughly
1.5 million of the 6.3 million students who had graduated this year, were unemployed. Of
those who graduated last year, 800,000 remained unemployed. In fact, according to the staterun China Daily, roughly one million graduates (termed “ant tribes” for their low social status,
poor living conditions and frenzied job seeking) live in squalor on the outskirts of China’s
major cities, commuting into the cities daily to look for work. Zac Hambides, China's Growing
Army of Unemployed Graduates, WORLD SOCIALIST (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.wsws.org/
articles/2010/oct2010/chin-o04.shtml; see also Horde of Unemployed Worries Stability-Obsessed
China, CNBC (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/business/12/17/08/
horde-unemployed-worries-stability-obsessed-china.
244 See Andrew Marshall, Asia Exists Crisis But Threat of Political Unrest Lingers,
JAKARTA GLOBE (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/business/asia-exits-crisisbut-threat-of-political-unrest-lingers/350940 (noting that unemployment is a lagging
indicator, and many political risk consultants are warning that 2010 may hold nasty surprises);
see also Paul Maley, China Could Face Political Unrest If It Fails To Prevent An Economic Slump, THE
AUSTRALIAN (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/danger-of-unrest-inchinese-decline/story-e6frg6t6-1111118673790 (noting that [the Communist Party's] big
worry is large demonstrations about the lack of jobs).
245 Habits are at first cobwebs, then cables. Spanish Proverb. QUOTATIONS ABOUT
HABITS (2011), http://www.quotegarden.com/habits.html.
246 China is far and away the largest recipient of FDI among developing countries
and in fact, ranks third in the world, behind only the U.K. & the U.S. See generally Rising FDI
Into China: The Facts Behind The Numbers, UNCTAD Investment Brief No. 2 (Jan. 4, 2007),
http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiiamisc20075_en.pdf; see also Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note
167.
247 See 4 PETER K. YU, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 192
(2007); see also Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
248 See Kelvin King, The Value of Intellectual Property, Intangible Assets and Goodwill,
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VOL. 7, May 2002, at 245-8, available at
http://nopr.niscair.res.in/bitstream/123456789/4919/1/JIPR%207%283%29%20245248.pdf. An example is the value of the Coca-Cola trademark, which is worth many times
more to the company than the millions of dollars in capital that it has invested in China; and
the same holds true for the patents and copyrights owned by pharmaceutical and software
companies doing business in China today. See Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
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to use the company's patents and other forms of technology (see where this is
going?).249 Thus, while MNEs create a transfer of technology through FDI
that is absorbed into China’s legitimate economy, a significant amount of this
IP is stolen and diverted into China’s illegitimate economy. 250 Then,
perpetuating the cycle of non-enforcement, MNEs fear retaliation to their
businesses in China and avoid taking actions that might offend the Chinese
government.251
Another bad habit supported by China's need for economic growth is
its heavy reliance on counterfeiting and piracy to support local economies.
The distribution of infringing goods takes place through a myriad of
wholesale markets located throughout China, many of which are financed and
established by local governments. 252 Retail and secondary-level wholesale
distributors travel to these wholesale markets to order infringing goods that
are then shipped to urban areas, rural locations, and overseas.253
The most notorious example of such an operation is the Yiwu, the
location of the Zhejiang China Small Commodities City Group ("CSCCG"
[?]), a wholesale market established with the aid of a ten million dollar
See Sumon Kumar Bhaumik, Saul Estrin & Klaus E. Meyer, Determinants of
Employment Growth at MNEs: Evidence from Egypt, India, South Africa and Vietnam, COMPARATIVE
ECONOMIC STUDIES VOL. 49, Mar. 2007, at 61-80, available at
http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/162790053_3.html; accord Pirates of the
21st Century, supra note 167.
250 One such example is the Suzhou laser disc factory, which reportedly produced
authorized copies for the California-based Microlink Systems during the day and produced
pirated copies at night. Hays, supra note 95; see also Georgios A. Antonopoulos, Anqi Shen &
Klaus von Lampe, Cigarette Counterfeiting in the PRC, NEWSL. NO. 55 (Int'l Inst. for Asian
Studies, Leiden, Netherlands) Autumn/Winter 2010, at 8, available at http://www.iias.nl/files/
iias_nl55_08.pdf (noting the diverse set of venues used for the production of counterfeit
cigarettes, including legitimate factories); accord Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
251 See Andrew Mertha, Putting Your Mouth Where Your Money Is: How U.S. Companies'
Fear of Chinese Retaliation Influences U.S. Trade Policy, in CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE POLICY: THE
NEW CONSTITUENCIES 59, 63 (Ka Zeng ed., 2007); see also y Pirates of the 21st Century, supra
note 167.
252 See The Wholesale Markets in China, LI & FUNG RESEARCH CENTRE - 4
INDUSTRIAL CLUSTER SERIES 12 (May 2006),
http://www.idsgroup.com/profile/pdf/industry_series/LFIndustrial4.pdf; see also Pirates of the
21st Century, supra note 167.
253 Pirated and counterfeit items make their way to a seemingly endless network of
ultimate sellers in China. For example, some products are sold by women who roam the
streets with catalogues looking for customers and who can direct an interested potential buyer
to a back alley warehouse where the items are sold. Similarly, CDs and DVDs are often sold
on the streets of Chinese cities by teenage boys who make small pay-offs to the police. Hays,
supra note 94.
Other operations are less mobile. In Shenzhen, e.g., where officers actually patrol
for counterfeit items, and where indeed shop windows are devoid of counterfeits, pushy sales
representatives approach every shopper and whisper what is really available in their stores.
Customers can enter a special kiosk where a wall of dresses is pulled back, or handbags
pushed aside, to reveal a library of catalogues featuring items that, if chosen, will be handed
over in a room up a back staircase, behind a tattoo parlor, in a nearby warehouse, or for the
ultra-unadventurous, back in the shop. Mind games, ECONOMIST, Nov. 10, 2007, at 82; see also
Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
249
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government investment.254 With a total floor space of over 500,000 square
meters containing over 24,000 booths and over 400,000 different varieties of
items, the market is visited by about 200,000 people daily, who purchase an
estimated two tons of goods per day.255 It is estimated that about 80-90% of
all goods offered for sale in Yiwu are IP-infringing goods.256
Not surprisingly, the CSCG has become essential to Yiwu's economy,
accounting for nearly 26% of the entire tax revenue and becoming the single
largest taxpayer in its municipality,257 which is essential because it integrates
the CSCG and the trade in infringing goods into the local economy, the taxes
supporting a host of public services.258 In addition, the illegitimate trade has
given rise to a host of legitimate businesses that support it; for example,
hotels, restaurants, night clubs, transportation companies, and warehouse and
storage facilities all depend on the trade in counterfeit and pirated goods. 259
Thus, shutting down Yiwu's trade in IP-infringing goods would essentially
result in shutting down the local economy.260 Moreover, the resultant high
levels of unemployment would likely lead to social chaos and unrest, which as
mentioned supra, the PRC government fears more than anything else. 261
Finally, there are hundreds of other towns like Yiwu in China that depend
upon the trade in IP-infringing goods to sustain the local economy; all told,
there are likely millions, if not tens of millions, of people in China who
depend directly or indirectly on such trade for their economic livelihood and
survival.262 Thus, of late it has become somewhat of a social statement to buy
Shanzhai goods because they support workers and factories in China.263
Finally (and this list is non-exhaustive) a third bad habit supported by
China's need for economic growth is local protectionism. After substantial
efforts by both the U.S. government and industry lobbying groups, it appears
that central level leaders understand the importance of protecting IP for
promoting China’s long-term economic development; however, central level
254 See The Wholesale Markets in China, supra note 252; see also Pirates of the 21st Century,
supra note 167; and Litke, supra note 95.
255 See On China Commodity City, A City Based on the Market (2011),
http://en.onccc.com/yiwu/view1.htm; and Litke, supra note 96; see also The Wholesale Markets
in China, supra note 252; and Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
256 See WILLIAM BERGH GAMBLE, FREEDOM: AMERICA'S COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE IN THE GLOBAL MARKET 141 (2007) (referencing the research of Professor
Daniel Chow).
257 See Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
258 Id.
259 See The Wholesale Markets in China, supra note 252; and Pirates of the 21st Century,
supra note 167.
260 See Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
261 See Horde of Unemployed Worries Stability-Obsessed China , CNBC (Dec. 17, 2008),
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/business/12/17/08/horde-unemployed-worries-stabilityobsessed-china; accord Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
262 See Report: Asian Counterfeits Hurting U.S. Companies (2007),
http://www.manufacturing.net/Asian-Counterfeits-Hurt-US.aspx?menuid=282; and TED C.
FISHMAN, CHINA INC. 235-8 (2005) and Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
263 Hays, supra note 94.
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authorities are legislative and policy-making bodies located in Beijing, and
enforcement of the law occurs at the local level where commitments to
suppressing IP theft are questionable. 264 As the Chinese proverb says,
"heaven is high and the emperor is far away."265
In addition, local level leaders are evaluated by the economic
performance of their local political units and because trade in IP-infringing
goods can create a boom to the local economy, these leaders are often
reluctant to shut down productive economic activity in which, as explained
supra in the case of Yiwu, local government entities often have a direct
financial interest. 266 Furthermore, former and current government officials
and Party leaders who often own the large corporate conglomerates running
wholesale markets are able to exert enough influence on local enforcement
authorities to protect the flourishing trade in IP-infringing goods. 267
Moreover, local enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges beholden to
the local governments that appointed them likely face pressures to protect the
local trade in such commodities. 268 According to one report, the odds of
going to jail for counterfeiting or piracy are, “at most, 3 out of 100.”269
IX. ACTA FUTILITY
To be sure, it is not the purpose of this comment to suggest that
ACTA is void of any good ideas. Nor is the intention of the comment to
summarize ACTA's provisions ad nauseam. There are plenty of materials
available that achieve those ends. 270 Rather, the aim of the discussion has
been to propose that ACTA, as a treaty, is merely a promise to honor other
promises, with a few additional promises. However, isn’t there an implication
in the making of a promise that it will be honored? Is it at all realistic to think
that a promise intended to secure the honoring of previous promises gone unhonored will be honored (read that again slowly; it really does make sense)?
Framed in such a manner, the absurdity of the reasoning hopefully becomes
apparent. In short, it is not the substance of ACTA that is questionable
(though there are ample opinions to the contrary271), but rather the logic on
which its creation is premised.
See Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
Hennessey, supra note 115, at 1292.
266 See Pirates of the 21st Century, supra note 167.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Willi Paul, Throwing Away Our R&D: Counterfeiting in China, SUSTAIN LANE BLOG
(May 28, 2010), http://www.sustainlane.com/reviews/throwing-away-our-r-d-counterfeitingin-china/V7RBSHQV43HWORHA44BHAZLUWBRN.
270 For an overview of ACTA's April 2010 Public Predecisional/Deliberative Draft's
key provisions, see Fellmeth, supra note 72; for more detailed analyses, see generally Kaminski,
supra note 52, at 247; and Charles R. McManis, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA): Two Tales Of A Treaty, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1235 (2009).
271 Most commentators take issue with ACTA on human rights grounds, positing
that the effects, though directed to cure infringement problems like those of China's, will fall
primarily on innocent consumers. See, e.g., Danny O'Brien, Blogging ACTA Across the
264
265
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Thus, the final section will expound upon what commentators have
duly noted, that is, that China has and will continue to develop its laws on its
own terms despite the "confrontationist" 272 approaches of more developed
nations and the imposition of IP law "at gunpoint."273
A. Le Monde Tremblera274
In a perfect world, the nations of the globe would have developed
socially and economically at an equal pace, and along similar ideological lines.
That unfortunately is not how things have shaken down. No matter, there is
still hope for an international scheme in which the rights and privileges of
respective powers are both respected and enforced, and China in due time,
will likely follow suit with the ideals of its neighbors, if for no other reason
than its own self-interest.
276

well.

Long the workshop of the world,275 China aspires to be the brains as
Driven by its concern for economic development, China has focused

Globe: Lessons From Korea, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Jan. 29, 2010),
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/01/acta-and-korea (expressing concerns that ACTA
risks undercutting the principle of the rule of law and discussing possible conflicts with
human rights); and Claudio Brenni, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement(ACTA): A
New Obstacle to Human Rights?, 3D Three (June 2010),
http://www.3dthree.org/pdf_3D/201006ACTAInformationnote.pdf (hating on ACTA in a
major way, calling it the emblem of the maximum protection approach of IP rights through
the use of offensive implementing strategies); and for a bizarre, hysterical and dramatic visual
depiction of the horrors that ACTA holds in store for the world, see Posting of
Ramenlover7000, ACTA - Destroying Your Rights Since 2010, YouTube (Aug. 22, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BRttJJ18Spw; but for a more civilized discussion of
possible negative ACTA implications, see Kaminski, supra note 52, at 250 (positing that ACTA
represents a form of "international bullying" that attempts to impose "IP maximalism" from
the top down, rather than letting individual countries choose appropriate levels of sanctions
and protection).
272 U.S. Intellectual Property Talks "Frank and Businesslike," AUSTL. FIN. REV., Feb. 24,
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE File.
273 See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 30-55 (Stanford Univ. Press
1995); and for an account by an author who studied twenty international crises between 1905
and 1971, see Russell J. Leng & Hugh G. Wheeler, Influence Strategies, Success, and War, 23 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 655, 681 (1979) (noting that "an assertive, bullying, strategy is both less
effective and more risky than much of the folklore of power policies would have it").
274 Although accounts vary, Napoleon Bonaparte, upon visiting St. Helena in 1816,
is said to have pointed to China while surveying a map saying, "China is a sickly, sleeping
giant. But when she awakes the world will tremble." WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE'S POLITICAL
DICTIONARY 666 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1968). Behold. She stirreth.
275 See generally Battle of Ideas, supra note 41; see also Karen E. Klein, Outsourcing in China
Today, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Oct. 15, 2007, at 24, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/oct2007/sb20071015_563438.htm
(positing that anybody looking to grow a long-term business has to look at China as a
sourcing option).
276 Battle of Ideas, supra note 41.
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its attention on patents as the engine of technological development.277 Even
as far back as April 1, 1985, (the first day the Chinese Patent Office opened)
3,455 patent applications were filed - apparently a world record. 278 More
recently, in 2006, the Chinese government set ambitious goals for China to
become an "innovative nation" and to reduce reliance on foreign technology
to below thirty percent. 279 Reflective of this goal, the number of patent
applications in China is expected to surpass the number of applications in
both the U.S. and Japan in 2011. 280 Chinese firms are increasingly seeking
patents abroad, a sign that they plan to protect their technology when
exporting it.281 This is the result of government officials' realization that no
one will create anything without some guarantee of protection.282 And protect
they will, as evidenced by recent infringement cases by Chinese companies
against foreign firms.283
Still, many point to the pervasive, yet rarely articulated belief among
Chinese officials that China can protect and enforce IP rights in high-tech
industries while completely ignoring the counterfeiting of luxury brands or
piracy in media industries.284 To these officials, "uneven development" is a
positive virtue, 285 and IP protection is just an engine of economic
See Ronald S. Fernando, Understanding Judicial Patent Enforcement in China, CHINA
PAT. & TRADEMARKS, Apr. 2008, at 24, 25-27 (noting the efficacy of patent enforcement in
China).
278 PING LIN & JING A. ZHANG, R&D INCENTIVES, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN CHINA'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SECTOR AND THE
FORCES OF GLOBALISATION 47, 49 (Elspeth Thomson & Jon Sigurdson eds., 2008).
279 China Sets Goal for Developing Science, Technology in 15 Years, PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE (Feb. 9, 2009), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200602/09/
eng20060209_241328.html; see also Battle of Ideas, supra note 41 (noting that "since 2006 it has
pursued a deliberate policy of gathering as many patents as possible and developing homegrown technologies—not least because Chinese companies pay around $2 billion a year in
licensing and royalties to American firms alone, according to America’s Bureau of Economic
Analysis").
280 Annual Number of Chinese Patent Apps of Surpass Japan and U.S., People's Daily
Online (Oct. 28, 2010),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/7180676.html.
281 Battle of Ideas, supra note 41 (noting the rise in patens won in America by Chinese
firms from 90 in 1999 to 1,225 in 2008).
282 Mind Games, supra note 253.
283 See Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Largest Damages Award for Patent Infringement,
Int'l Law Office (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/
Newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=0b0a92e6-3305-4d9a-8469-02ee61a0db79; see also Brad Lou,
Zhejiang Courts Making a Mark on China's IP Law, CHINA BUS. LAW BLOG (Feb. 18, 2009),
http://chinabusinesslaw.blogspot.com/2009/
02/zhejiang-courts-making-mark-on-chinas.html; see also Dr Kening Li, China's New Strategy
Puts Intellectual Property First (2009), http://www.out-law.com/page-10472 (observing that
China became the most litigious country in 2005 for IP cases, surpassing the U.S. and advising
that "foreign companies should be prepared to face substantial new global and domestic
competition from the growing output of China's increasingly well-subsidized and wellsupported IP generators").
284 Hennessey, supra note 115, at 1289.
285 See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 173, 220 (Daniel J. Gervais ed.,
277
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development that can run with some of its "working parts" missing. 286
However, it is worth remembering that the U.S. was the great IP rights
infringer when it was a developing country in the 18th century. 287 The
difference is just one of degree; that is, the development of a global
economy 288 and the surge in global population make the effects of
infringement more pronounced.
In any event, although China is a little "patent heavy" in its focus, it is
still good news for the rest of the world because as one commentator noted,
"countries that create IP eventually enforce it as well." 289 For example, in
former copycat countries like Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan,
infringers were put out of business when their activities began to threaten
legitimate domestic producers of clothes and other goods. 290 Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude that when legitimate Chinese companies are producing
the world’s favorite handbags and cell phones, laws will be better enforced to
protect them.291
Finally, as IP continues to assume a more prevalent place among
China's priorities, China's laws will likely develop accordingly. For example, in
2008, China's top legislature approved a revision of the Patent Law, which
made a number of amendments to the patent application process and
expanded patent protection.292 Specifically, the revision included the adoption
of a so-called "absolute novelty" standard that is applied internationally and
requires Chinese patent examiners to consider public use evidence both
domestically and abroad when processing applications.293 In addition, the law
for the first time contains a provision that the People's Court can fine
infringers between $1,500 and $150,000 when damages cannot be specifically
identified.294 Other areas of reform include China's new PRC Tort Liability
Law, which for the first time determines through definitive rules the
responsibility of network service providers regarding online infringement
matters. 295 Specifically, the scope of application of the "Notice and Take

2007) (noting that China's uneven development is a factor in making China's crossover to
self-interested IP enforcement difficult to predict).
286 Hennessey, supra note 115, at 1297.
287 See Johns, supra note 41.
288 For an explanation of the magnitude of the global economy, see Economy Watch
(2011), http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/world-economicindicators/global-economy/define-global-economy.html.
289 Battle of Ideas, supra note 41 (quoting Dominique Guellec of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)).
290 Handbags at Dawn, ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 2006, at 24.
291 Id.
292 Tuo Yannan, New China Patent Law is Unveiled, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 9, 2009 at 9,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bw/200902/09/content_7455384.htm.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Tort Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) 2009 China Law LEXIS
668 [hereinafter P.R.C. Tort Law]; Yang Xun, Online Accountability, CHINA L. & PRAC., Jun. 2010,
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Down" rule, which mirrors the "Notice and Take Down" rule under the U.S.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act,296 is expanded from copyright infringement
to all types of rights, including trademark, patent, and privacy.297 Under the
new law, even if no notice is received, network service providers may be
found liable if the aggrieved party can prove that the providers knew that the
infringement had taken place but failed to take necessary measures. 298 In
short, legal developments like these evince a sense of confidence that China
can and will take steps necessary for the protection of IP rights as those rights
become increasingly important to China's economic development.
Therefore, as Chinese companies continue to develop their own
patents, copyrights and trademarks and seek to protect them both inside and
outside China, the nation as a whole will likely become more sensitive to the
protection and enforcement of IP rights.299
X. CONCLUSION
As long as valuable property exists, there will be those willing to steal
it; accordingly, as long as IP remains a valuable asset, which it most certainly
will, there will be counterfeiters and pirates. Moreover, as long as Johnny
Depp is alive, there will likely be more Pirates of the Caribbean movies, but
that is a discussion for another day.
IP protection is a constant game of cat-and-mouse. Frustrating as that
is, the evidence suggests that the more developed economies are going to have
to grin and bear it for the time being. As China's economic progress
continues, it may actually end up being the Chinese that define the rules of IP
enforcement.
As for ACTA, while it has some new potentially beneficial features, it
would be unfortunate if those features translate into burdens for the mostlylaw-abiding citizens of the world as some suggest, because indeed, it is
virtually certain that ACTA's effects are intended to be felt by China, one way
or the other. It might as well be called ACCTA (the Anti-ChineseCounterfeiting Trade Agreement).
Therefore, ACTA will most definitely be useless without the ultimate
cooperation of China, and only marginally effective with its cooperation.
Cooperation is a relative term. After all, China is, for all purposes, a
cooperating member of other pro-IP agreements. Moreover, if ACTA were
really intended for "like-minded trading partners," it would certainty miss its
at 2 (discussing the law as it applies to the liability of network service providers regarding
online infringement matters).
296 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 512(c), 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000)
(providing that upon receiving proper notification of claimed infringement, the internet
service provider must expeditiously take down or block access to the material).
297 P.R.C. Tort Law, supra note 295; see generally Yang Xun, supra note 295.
298 P.R.C. Tort Law, supra note 295; see generally Yang Xun, supra note 295.
299 The Boot is on the Other Foot, ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 2006, at 55-6.
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mark because China's "mind" is not "like" those of its Western neighbors, as
its unique and brilliant history illustrates.
In any event, it's highly unlikely that the Chinese will hold a grudge for
not being involved in the big ACTA roll-out or for not being made privy to its
provisions. Is there really any question that they don't have a nice counterfeit
copy by now?

结束
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